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1. Introduction
Nonconvex technologies can give rise to multiple competitive equilibria. We extend 
intuition about multiplicity in models of intersectoral labor migration in two circum-
stances. First, production in a sector might create pollution that lowers productivity in 
the other sector. Second, cumulative production in one sector might lower costs there 
due to learning-by-doing that is external to firms. Our main contribution is to explain 
why multiplicity may be very unlikely in exactly the circumstances where previous 
models would suggest that it is likely to occur.
In some circumstances, the payoff from moving to a different sector (‘migrating’) is 
higher if many other agents also migrate. In this situation, actions are strategic comple-
ments and there may be multiple equilibria. For example, in Matsuyama’s (1991) and 
Krugman’s (1991) migration models, agents decide whether to work in the Agricultural 
or Manufacturing sector. For some range of labor allocations, an externality causes the 
benefit of working in a particular sector to increase with the number of workers there. 
Agents’ decisions depend on their beliefs about what other agents will do, rather than 
merely on exogenous or predetermined economic fundamentals. This model has been 
used to explain why similar countries might follow completely different development 
paths.
Abstract:
In familiar models, a decrease in the friction facing mobile factors (e.g., lowering their adjustment costs) 
increases a coordination problem, leading to more circumstances where there are multiple equilibria. We 
show that a decrease in friction can decrease coordination problems when a production externality arises 
from a changing stock, e.g. of pollution or knowledge. In general, the relation between the amount of 
friction that mobile factors face and the likelihood of multiple equilibria is non-monotonic.
If it is very costly for agents to change previous decisions – i.e., if the amount of fric-
tion is extreme – then there is little scope for agents’ current decisions to depend on 
their beliefs about what other agents will do. In this case, the multiplicity of equilib-
ria is unlikely. If the cost of changing previous decisions is negligible (and given that 
actions are strategic complements), it is natural to think that beliefs are a greater factor 
in the decision-making process, making the multiplicity of equilibria more likely. This 
type of reasoning leads to the conjecture that lower friction (cheaper migration costs) 
increases the ‘likelihood’ of multiplicity. We show that this conjecture is not true in 
general.
Our model can be used to describe two types of situations. This flexibility is impor-
tant because it shows that our results are relevant beyond the case we emphasize, arising 
from cross-sectoral pollution externalities. There, Manufacturing output creates pol-
lution flows that raise pollution stocks, damaging natural capital and lowering labor 
productivity in Agriculture, as in Copeland and Taylor (1999). At a point in time the 
wage differential depends only on the stock of natural capital, which is inversely related 
to the pollution stock. Increased Manufacturing output increases the pollution stock, 
lowering future labor productivity in Agriculture, altering the future wage differential.
By relabelling variables, the model can be interpreted as an extension of Krugman’s 
(1991) migration model to include learning-by-doing in Manufacturing, as in Mat-
suyama (1992). With this interpretation, labor productivity in Manufacturing depends 
on the amount of knowledge in that sector. Manufacturing production increases the 
stock of knowledge via learning-by-doing; this knowledge decays if the level of pro-
duction falls. Changes in the stock of knowledge alter the wage differential, changing 
incentives to migrate.
We describe our research question and results, and then review related literature. 
Then in section 2 we present the model and in section 3 the results.
1.1 Research question and results
Dynamic models with complementarities can give rise to two or more stable steady states. 
Each stable steady state has a basin of attraction, defined as the set of initial conditions 
from which there is an equilibrium trajectory that approaches that steady state. The inter-
section of two basins of attraction is the ‘Region of Multiplicity’ , or ROM. If the ROM is 
empty, there exists a unique equilibrium trajectory for all initial conditions. In this case, 
we regard the equilibrium as unique, despite the existence of multiple steady states. In 
our usage, ‘equilibrium’ always refers to a trajectory, not simply to a steady state. If the 
ROM has positive measure, then there exists a set with positive measure such that from 
any point in this set there are multiple equilibrium trajectories. In this case, the model 
exhibits multiple equilibria for some initial conditions.
How does a change in intersectoral labor migration costs affect the multiplicity of 
equilibria? There are two ways to interpret the statement that a parameter change makes 
multiplicity ‘more likely’ :
Interpretation 1: The change increases the measure of the set of other parameters
for which multiplicity occurs.
Interpretation 2: The change increases themeasure of the ROM, holding fixed other
parameters.
Interpretation 2 means that there are more initial conditions for which there exist
multiple equilibria.
(a1)
(a2)
(b1)
(b2)
Figure 1. Phase space for different models. (a1) one-state, unique equilibrium; (a2) two-state, unique equilib-
rium; (b1) one-state, multiple equilibria; (b2) two-state, multiple equilibria.
The model contains two state variables. The first of these is the fraction, L, of labor in
Manufacturing. We denote the second state variable as K. In both interpretations of the
model, a larger K increases the Manufacturing-Agriculture wage differential, making it
more attractive towork in themanufacturing sector. Themechanismbehind this relation
differs in the two interpretations of the model.
In the pollution setting, we interpret K as a pollution stock. An increase in L raises
manufacturing output, increasing the flow of pollution generated in that sector, thereby
increasing the pollution stock. The higher pollution stock lowers productivity in Agri-
culture: the pollution externality is ‘cross-sectoral’ . In the learning-by-doing setting, we
can interpretK as the stock or knowledge inManufacturing. An increase in L again raises
manufacturing output, but now this higher output contributes to learning-by-doing,
increasingK. The higher stock of knowledge raisesManufacturing productivity, increas-
ing the Manufacturing-Agriculture wage differential. To avoid repetition, we focus on
the cross-sectoral pollution interpretation.
Figure 1 illustrates the relation between the models with one and with two state vari-
ables, and the distinction between the two interpretations of ‘more likely’. In the model
with one state variable (L), illustrated by panels (a1) and (b1), the state space is [0, 1];
there are two steady states, L = 0 and L = 1 where, respectively, all labor is in Agricul-
ture or in Manufacturing. In the model with two state variables, (L,K), illustrated by
panels (a2) and (b2), the state space is the unit square. Here there are two stable steady
states, (0, 0) and (1, 1). In the first, all labor is in Agriculture and the pollution stock is
zero, so agricultural productivity is high. In the second, all labor is inManufacturing and
pollution is at its maximum level, equal to 1, causing agricultural productivity to be low.
In panels (a1) and (a2), the basins of attraction for the steady states, in both the one-
state and the two-state models, are the sets A and B. These sets are intervals in the one-
state model and regions in the two-state model. The sets A and B have no intersection
except for the boundary, which is of measure 0. A typical interior point a ∈ A (or b ∈ B)
has a unique trajectory to the steady state where all labor is in Agriculture (respectively,
Manufacturing). Panels (a1) and (a2) illustrate the situation where the equilibrium is
unique and there is hysteresis: the steady state depends on the initial condition.
In contrast, in panels (b1) and (b2) the state space consists of three sets, A,B and C.
The basin of attraction for the steady state with all labor in Agriculture is A ∪ C and
the basin of attraction for the steady state with all labor in Manufacturing is B ∪ C. The
intersection of these two sets, C, is the ROM. From point c ∈ C there are two trajecto-
ries, approaching different steady states. The equilibrium is not unique in the models
represented by panels (b1) and (b2), because there is a set of initial conditions, with 
positive measure, for which there are multiple equilibrium trajectories.
According to Interpretation 1, a decrease in friction makes multiplicity more likely if 
it increases the measure of the set of parameters for which panels (b1) or (b2) rather than 
panels (a1) or (a2) describes the dynamics. According to Interpretation 2, the decrease 
in friction makes multiplicity more likely if it increases the measure of the ROM, C.
The chief result from our two-dimensional model is that there is a non-monotonic 
relation between the measure of the ROM and friction in the adjustment for labor. Thus, 
according to Interpretation 2, a decrease in labor adjustment costs may make multiplicity 
either more or less likely. A decrease in labor adjustment costs does, however, increase 
the set of other parameter values for which the ROM is positive. Thus, according to Inter-
pretation I, lower adjustment costs make multiplicity more likely, just as in the standard 
one-state models. But according to Interpretation 2, lower adjustment costs might make 
multiplicity either more or less likely. Taken together, the two results imply that if labor 
adjustment costs are extremely small, the measure of the ROM is positive for a wide 
range of parameter values, but the measure is always extremely small. Multiplicity in 
this case is possible, but it occurs only for a small set of initial conditions and in that 
sense is not likely.
For the type of model we consider, this non-monotonicity requires the second 
state variable, e.g. a stock pollutant instead of a flow pollutant. However, the non-
monotonicity survives even if the stock pollutant decays very quickly. In that case, the 
amount of damage-creating pollution remaining over a small interval of time closely 
tracks the emissions flow during that interval – because emissions flows over previous 
periods have already largely dissipated. In this respect, the two-state model with rapidly 
decaying stock appears to approximate a one-state model with a flow pollutant. Never-
theless, the non-monotonicty does not arise under a flow pollutant. Thus, two models 
that appear similar might lead to different types of results.
Even if the pollution stock decays rapidly (causing the stock to closely track the pol-
lution flow), it remains possible for the labor allocation to change still more quickly. 
Rapid adjustment of labor requires that migration costs be small. When the speed of 
adjustment in the labor market is fast relative to the speed of adjustment of the pollution 
stock, a worker can move between sectors quickly enough to insure that she remains 
in the high wage sector ‘most of the time’ . In this case, for most initial conditions, the 
worker’s migration decision is not sensitive to her beliefs about what other workers will 
do. Multiplicity is possible, but the ROM is small.
We use a deterministic model and assume that agents have rational point expecta-
tions: they correctly anticipate the evolution of the economy. If agents were myopic, 
there would be no role for expectations to influence behavior. There might nevertheless 
be multiple stable steady states, each with its basin of attraction. In this case, there would 
be hysteresis, but not multiplicity of equilibria (as we use that term).
1.2 Literature review
Previous literature, excepting Krugman (1991), Fukao and Benabou (1993) and Karp 
and Paul (2007), neglects the relation between parameters of the model and the mea-
sure of the ROM, and concentrates on the relation between parameter values and the 
existence of a ROM with positive measure. There are two likely reasons for this empha-
sis. First, although it is sometimes straightforward to determine conditions under which 
the ROM has positive measure, the comparative statics of this measure are complicated.
Second, intuition (supported by Krugman’s model) may have encouraged the idea that 
the two senses in which a parameter change can make multiplicity ‘more likely’ are 
essentially the same.
Multiplicity of equilibria arises when there are increasing returns to scale, or some 
other feature that makes the economy non-convex. Greater convexity of adjustment 
costs (more generally, increased friction) appears to counteract the effect of cross-
sectoral pollution or increasing returns to scale. Therefore, a natural conjecture is that 
more convex adjustment costs make multiplicity less likely. Karp and Paul (2007) use  
numerical methods to show that this conjecture is not true in general in a two-state ver-
sion of Krugman (1991). Here we use a simpler framework and obtain analytic results, 
thereby improving our intuition for this type of model.
There is little empirical evidence regarding the type of multiplicity we described 
above. Davis and Weinstein (2002, 2004) find that Japanese data is consistent with 
increasing returns to scale, but that the data is inconsistent with the existence of mul-
tiple stable steady states – a necessary condition for multiplicity of equilibria in this 
setting. Moro (2003) estimates a multiple equilibrium model of wage inequality; Brock 
and Durlauf (2001, 2002) discuss the estimation of discrete choice models with social 
interactions, a situation that can lead to multiple equilibria.
There is a different type of multiplicity, often referred to as ‘indeterminacy’, that 
occurs when there exists a continuum of equilibrium trajectories to a single steady state. 
Indeterminacy is an important topic in macro-economics, where the role of costs of 
adjustment (friction) is significant. Benhabib and Farmer (1999) review this literature; 
recent contributions include Cooper and Haltiwanger (1996), Cooper and Johri (1997), 
Wen (1998a,b), Benhabib et al. (2000), Nishimura and Shimonura (2002) and Lubik and 
Schorfheide (2004). A recurring question concerns the specification for which plausible 
estimates of adjustment costs and returns to scale are consistent with indeterminacy. In 
these models, lower costs of adjustment (less friction for the mobile factor) mean that 
indeterminacy is more likely, using Interpretation 1. Since the analysis of these models 
(typically) examines behavior in the neighborhood of the steady state, no attention is 
paid to Interpretation 2.
Recent theoretical papers show that changing an assumption of migration models 
may eliminate the multiplicity of equilibria. Frankel and Pauzner (2000) show that mul-
tiplicity disappears in a variation of Matsuyama’s model where the wage differential is 
subject to Brownian motion and there exist ‘dominance regions’. In another variation of 
this model, Herrendorf et al. (2000) show that there is a unique equilibrium if agents are 
sufficiently heterogeneous. We provide another explanation that might either increase 
or diminish the importance of coordination problems.
2. The model
The discrete time model makes it easy to obtain the comparative static results in section 3. 
To introduce our model and also to establish the connection between our discrete time 
formulation and previous literature, we begin with a one-state, two-period formula-
tion (section 2.1). This model reproduces the major insights from Krugman (1991) who  
considers increasing returns to scale that are external to firms, whereas we focus on cross-
sectoral pollution, where both sectors have constant returns to scale. This difference 
changes the interpretation of the one-state model but not the nature of the results.
Our contribution uses a two-state, three-period model where all migration occurs 
during the first two periods (section 2.2). We use the two-state, three-period model in
section 3 to show analytically that an increase in intersectoral labor mobility (a decrease 
in friction) can reduce the set of initial conditions from which there emanate multiple 
equilibrium trajectories. That is, an increase in mobility can decrease the measure of the 
ROM, and in this respect make multiplicity less likely.
2.1 The two-period, one-state model
This section obtains the insights from Krugman’s continuous time formulation using 
a two-period model. The initial stock of labor in Manufacturing is 0 ≤ L ≤ 1 and the 
measure of entrants into Manufacturing is u, so the amount of labor in Manufacturing 
in the next period is L + u. Workers who move incur a cost of migration in the current 
period and (possibly) obtain a higher wage in the next. The discount factor is β . The 
manufacturing wage is fixed at αM . Pollution arising from the manufacturing sector in 
the second period equals L + u. Average and marginal productivity (and thus the wage) 
in Agriculture in this period equals αA − b(L + u); each unit of pollution lowers the 
wage in Agriculture by b units. This one-state variable model describes a flow pollutant. 
The Manufacturing-Agriculture wage differential in the second period therefore equals 
a + b(L + u), with a ≡ αM − αA. We assume that a < 0 and a + b > 0: if all workers 
are in the same sector, that is the high-wage sector.
The social cost of migration is u2/2γ , with  γ > 0. Migration services are compet-
itively supplied, so the price of migration (the amount that a migrant pays in order to 
switch sectors) is |u|/γ . A higher value of γ means that adjustment costs are lower: there 
is less friction. An agent who decides to migrate pays the migration cost in the current 
period, in order to be in a different sector at the next period.
The present value of the benefit minus the cost of migrating to Manufacture (u > 0) 
or to Agriculture (u < 0) equals the present value of the wage differential minus the cost 
of migration:
n(L, u) ≡ 1
γ
(βγ (a + b(L + u)) − u). (1)
For bγβ < 1, the net benefit of migration decreases with the number of other agents
migrating. In this case, actions are strategic substitutes and the equilibrium is unique.
Agents play a coordination game (i.e. actions are strategic complements), and there are
multiple equilibria, if and only if bγβ > 1, as we hereafter assume.
Figure 2 graphs the migration constraints 0 ≤ L + u ≤ 1 (the dotted lines) and the
solution to n = 0 for bγβ > 1 (the solid line). The L coordinates of the points of intersec-
tion between the graph ofn = 0 and themigration constraints (the heavy dots in figure 2)
define the interval [1 − (a + b)βγ ,−βaγ ]. This interval corresponds to the interval C
in figure 1, panel (b1). The ROM consists of the intersection of this interval and the set
of feasible initial conditions, [0, 1]. For an initial condition (a value of L) in the ROM,
the value of u that satisfies n(L, u) = 0 (i.e., a point on the solid line) is an unstable equi-
librium.1 At initial conditions inside the ROM there are two stable equilibria: all labor
moves to Manufacturing or to Agriculture. For example, at u = 1 − L for L ∈ ROM, the
benefit of moving to Manufacturing exceeds the cost (n(L, 1 − L) > 0) so it is a stable
1We use the standard notion of stability. At an interior equilibrium, n = 0 and dn/du > 0. If a small
measure of agents ‘deviate’ (e.g., they migrate to Manufacturing when their equilibrium action is to remain
in Agriculture), then other agents would want to follow the deviation. The interior equilibrium is therefore
unstable.
Figure 2. The ROM in a one-period model with βγG > 1. The heavy dots, given by the L coordinates of the solid
and the dotted lines, show the boundary of the ROM.
equilibrium for all labor to move to Manufacturing. The length of the ROM is
Length of ROM = max{0,min{1,−βaγ }) − max{0, 1 − (a + b)βγ }}. (2)
For initial conditions to the left of the ROM, the unique equilibrium sends all labor to 
Agriculture. For initial conditions to the right of the ROM, the unique equilibrium sends 
all labor to Manufacturing.
The existence of multiplicity requires a combination of patience, a large externality, 
and low adjustment costs (large values of β , b, γ ), just as in Krugman (1991). An increase 
in any of these factors increases the length of the ROM when this is positive and less than 
1. Thus, lower adjustment cost makes multiplicity ‘ more likely’ in both senses described 
in the Introduction.
For this model we do not need any assumptions about the measure used to assess the 
likelihood of multiplicity; that is, the statement that multiplicity becomes more likely 
is independent of the priors on the initial condition and on b and β . For example, an 
increase in γ can cause initial conditions to enter the ROM but never cause initial con-
ditions to leave the ROM. Here, there is no loss in generality in using the length of the 
ROM to measure the likelihood of multiplicity. This measure corresponds to a uniform 
prior over initial conditions.
2.2 The three-period, two-state model
This section introduces the model that we use to establish the non-monotonicity of the 
ROM with respect to labor adjustment costs. Current migration affects the labor allo-
cation in the next period, and current pollution affects the pollution stock in the next 
period. The period index is t ∈ {0, 1, 2}. The predetermined stock of pollution in period 
t equals Kt and the flow of pollution in period t is GLt , with  G > 0. Each unit of labor 
in Manufacturing in the current period adds G units to the next-period pollution stock. 
The stock of pollution in t + 1 is
Kt+1 = Kt + G(Lt − Kt) ⇒ Kt+1 − Kt = G(Lt − Kt). (3)
Each unit of this stock reduces productivity in Agriculture by b units. The pollution stock
at t is predetermined, so the Agriculture wage at t is αA − bKt . The Manufacturing wage
is fixed at αM , so the Manufacturing-Agriculture wage differential is αA − αM − bKt =
a − bKt .
In order to focus on our research question, we hereafter set a = 0.5 and b = 1, so the
wage differential is 0.5 − Kt . With this choice of parameters, the wage differential equals
0 at K = 0.5. Using equation (3), the pollution stock is constant at K = 0.5 only for L =
0.5. Thus,K = L = 0.5 is the only interior steady state for this linearmodel. Just as in the
one-state model, this interior equilibrium is unstable. To further simplify notation, we
define the state variables as deviations from these values: lt ≡ Lt − 0.5 and kt ≡ Kt − 0.5.
By construction, kt equals the Manufacturing-Agricultural wage differential in period t.
The state space for the model is the square
−0.5 ≤ lt ≤ 0.5, −0.5 ≤ kt ≤ 0.5, (4)
and the equation of motion for the transformed pollution stock is
kt+1 = kt + G(lt − kt). (5)
Migration decisions are made at t = 0 and at t = 1. Agents base their migration deci-
sions on their beliefs about wages in periods t = 1 and t = 2 and on migration costs in
periods t = 0 and t = 1. Denote the amount of migration to Manufacturing in period
0 as u (as in the one-period model) and the amount of migration to Manufacturing in
period 1 as v. Negative values mean that migration is into Agriculture. The social cost
of migration is quadratic in migration, and the price that a migrant pays is | u |/γ in
period 0 and | v |/γ in period 1. In the initial period, (t = 0), the state variables L0, K0
are given.
We adopt the following parameter restriction:
0 < G ≤ 1. (6)
This restriction and equation (3) imply that the next-period pollution stock is a convex 
combination of the current pollution stock and the current flow. Because our objec-
tive is to demonstrate and explain a counter-intuitive result, it is sufficient to show that 
the result holds for reasonable – not for all – parameterizations.2 Section 3.2 notes that 
inequality (6) has a physical interpretation. If we think of the discrete time model as an 
approximation to a continuous time model, the value G = 1 corresponds to the fastest 
possible speed of adjustment of the pollution stock. The special case G = 1 also leads to 
particularly sharp analytic results.
3. Results
We first state our principal result. The next section contrasts the comparative statics of 
the ROM, with respect to γ , in the one-state and the two-state models. A final section 
offers a different perspective, sketching a continuous time model.
Our principal results use the following definitions:
X(k0) = −φ
χ
k0 − 0.5γβ
2G − 1
χ
2If we did not impose the upper limit in equation (6), our proof of Proposition 1 would require distin-
guishing between the two cases where G ≷ 1 + √γβ + 1/γβ . The restriction G ≤ 1 means that we need
consider only one of these two cases.
Y(k0) = −φ
χ
k0 + 0.5γβ
2G − 1
χ
, (7)
where
χ = γβG(γGβ + 3 + β − βG − G) + 1
φ = γβ(γβG + 2.0 − 1.0γβG2 − 3.0G + G2 − 2.0βG + β + βG2).
The following Proposition summarizes our main results; the appendix contains the
proof.
Proposition 1. Suppose that inequality (6) holds in our three-period model.
(i) β2Gγ > 1 is necessary and sufficient for the ROM to have positive measure. Thus,
an increase in γ (i.e., a decrease in friction) increases the range of other parameter
values (β and G) for which the ROM has positive measure.
(ii) The ROM is defined by the following set:
ROM = {(k, l) : −.5 ≤ k ≤ .5 ∩ −.5 ≤ l ≤ .5 ∩ Y(k) ≤ l ≤ X(k)}.
(iii) For β2Gγ > 1, the area of the ROM is non-monotonic in γ .
The condition for the ROM to have positive measure, β2Gγ > 1, is essentially the
same as for the one-state variable model (with G playing a role analogous to b) except
that here the condition involves β2 rather than β . This difference arises because in the
two-state variable model migration in period t affects the wage differential in period
t + 2 rather than in period t + 1 (aswas the case in the two-periodmodel). The lag occurs
because here the pollution stockmediates the effect of a change in labor allocation. In the
one-state variablemodel, which describes a flow pollutant, the change in labor allocation
has an immediate effect on the wage differential.
Figure 3 shows an example of the ROM. (Compare to figure 1, panel (b2).) The lower
line is the graph of X and the upper line is the graph of Y , defined in equation (7). The
area between these two lines is theROM.Restriction (6) andβ2Gγ > 1 imply thatχ > 0.
This fact, equation (7), and the assumption that γβ2G > 1 imply that X < Y . For any
k0, the vertical distance between Y and X is
M ≡ Y − X = γβ
2G − 1
χ
> 0. (8)
In general, we do not have a simple closed form expression for the area of the ROM.
However, if Y(0.5) < −0.5 or X(0.5) > −0.5, then the ROM does not include the NW
or SE corners of state space, and the ROM is a parallelogram. If X(0.5) > −0.5, the area
of the ROM is simplyM.3
3 If Y(0.5) < −0.5, the measure of the ROM is the horizontal rather than the vertical distance between
the lines X and Y .If the ROM includes the corner of state space (i.e., if X(0.5) < −0.5 < Y(0.5)), then in
computing its area we need to account for the ‘missing triangles’ at the corners, and the formula for the
measure becomesmore complicated. It is easy to confirm that any of these three configurations are possible,
depending on parameter values.
Figure 3. The ROM (area between lines) for β = 0.8, G = 0.5, γ = 2.5.
Interpretation 2 states that a parameter change increases the measure of the ROM. 
In general, checking this condition requires that we define the ‘measure’, i.e. a proba-
bility distribution for the set of initial conditions. For example, if the initial conditions 
are uniformly distributed over the unit square (the state space), then an increase in the 
area of the ROM unambiguously raises the likelihood that an arbitrarily chosen ini-
tial condition lies in the ROM. However, for a non-uniform distribution, an increase 
in the area of the ROM does not, in general, imply that it is ‘more likely’ that an ini-
tial condition lies in the ROM. For general parameter values, a change in γ causes the 
ROM to rotate as its area changes. Therefore, for two values of γ , γ1 
= γ2 the inequality 
area(ROM(γ1)) > area(ROM(γ2) does not imply that ROM(γ2) ⊂ ROM(γ1). Conse-
quently, unless the distribution of initial conditions is uniform over state space, the 
fact that area(ROM(γ1)) > area(ROM(γ2) does not necessarily mean that multiplicity 
is more likely under γ1 than under γ2.
In contrast, for the special case G = 1, equation (5) implies that the wage differential 
in the next period does not depend on the current wage differential (the current value 
of k). When G = 1 the ROM is flat; its boundaries are independent of k0. For  G = 1, the 
magnitude of γ affects only the vertical distance between the two lines in figure 3. In this 
case, area(ROM(γ1)) > area(ROM(γ2) does imply that Rom(γ2) ⊂ Rom(γ1). Thus, for 
G = 1, a larger area of the ROM means that multiplicity is ‘more likely’ , regardless of the 
distribution of the initial condition.
3.1 Comparison of one-state and two-state models
We noted that the presence of a second state variable (the stock of pollution) changes the 
relation between the amount of friction in labor adjustment and the likelihood of multi-
plicity of equilibria, as captured by the measure of the ROM. There are two reasons why 
the case G = 1 is particularly useful for illustrating this difference. First, as noted above, 
in this situation there is no loss in generality in using a uniform prior for initial condi-
tions. Second, the case G = 1 is of special interest because it leads to a model that appears 
to approximate the one-state variable model. Recall that G = 1 corresponds to complete 
adjustment of the pollution stock, following changes in L, within a single period. That 
is, when G = 1 the stock of pollution adjusts very rapidly – precisely the situation where 
we might expect that a one-dimensional model provides a good approximation to the 
two-dimensional model.
Figure 4. ForG = 1,measure of ROM is 0 below the dotted curve, increasing in γ between curves, and decreasing
in γ above solid curve.
WhenG = 1 the area of the ROM is max{0,M}, withM = γβ2 − 1/γ 2β2 − 1. Thus,
γ > β−2 is necessary and sufficient for the ROM to have positive measure when G =
1. For β = 1, M = 1/γ + 1, which is strictly decreasing in γ . For β < 1, M is first
increasing in γ (in the neighborhood β−2) and then decreasing. The measure reaches
its maximum at γm ≡ 1/2β2(2 + 2
√
1 − β2) and thereafter decreases. The maximum
point γm converges to β−2 as β → 1.
Figure 4 shows the graph of γm (the solid curve) and of β−2 (the dotted curve). For
combinations of (β , γ )  below the dotted curve, the measure of the ROM is 0; for a point 
between the two curves, the measure of the ROM is increasing in γ , holding β fixed; and 
for points above the solid curve, the measure is decreasing in γ , holding β fixed.
In presenting the model with two state variables, we set b = 1 and a = −0.5. There-
fore, to compare the two models we need to use these values in the model with one state 
variable. Here we also set β = 1, so that the necessary and sufficient condition for a 
positive measure of the ROM is γ > 1 in both models. With these restrictions, figure 5 
graphs the measure of the ROM in the two models, for γ > 1. This figure uses equations 
(2) and (8). The figure shows that the friction parameter γ has the opposite effect on the 
measure of the ROM in the two models.
3.2 A different perspective
Here we sketch a continuous time model to make three points. First, it provides a physical 
interpretation of restriction (6). Second, it shows that our discrete time model can be 
viewed as an approximation of a continuous time model. Third, the idea of two state 
variables adjusting at different speeds is transparent in the continuous time setting, but 
not in the discrete time setting. The online appendix describes a more general model.
The continuous time analog of equation (3) is
K˙ = g(Lt − Kt). (9)
If we hold Lt in equation (9) constant for one unit of time and solve that equation,
to rewrite it in the same form as equation (3), we see that the relation between the
Figure 5. Meausure of ROM, with β = G = b = 1. The solid curve shows that for the model with one state vari-
able, the measure increases with γ . The dotted curve shows that for the model with two state variables, the
measure decreases with γ .
two parameters is G = 1 − e−g . Because g ≤ ∞, the restriction G ≤ 1 is reasonable. Of
course G > 0 because the pollution flow affects the stock.
Define a ‘provisional’ steady state of pollution as the steady state corresponding to
a fixed value of labor allocation. For example, consider two economies. The first has
been largely rural, with only 5 per cent of its labor force in Manufacturing (L = 0.05),
and the second has been industrialized, with 95 per cent of labor in the Manufactur-
ing sector (L = 0.95). If the two economies have been at their respective stages for a
long period of time, then in both economies the respective pollution stocks will be
close to their ‘provisional’ steady states: K = 0.05 for the first economy and K = 0.95
for the second. These are the values of K that solve K˙ = 0 in equation (9). The rela-
tively low level of manufacturing in the first economy corresponds to a relatively cleaner
environment.
In the continuous time setting, adjustment to a provisional steady state can be made
arbitrarily rapid, by increasing the speed of adjustment parameter g in equation (9).
As g → ∞, the pollution stock adjusts instantaneously. For large g, the pollution stock
never deviates far from the pollution flow. Therefore, for large g a flow pollutant model
approximates a stock pollutant pollutant model. In contrast, in the discrete time setting
with our timing convention, adjustment of pollution to a provisional steady state takes
at least one period, i.e. it always occurs with a lag. The two-state discrete time model
cannot exactly reproduce the one-state model.
Define u as the flow of labor into Manufacturing (for u > 0) or into Agriculture (for
u < 0), so dL/dt = u. The flow cost of migration is u2t /2γ , so a migrant at time t pays
the migration cost |ut|/γ . As in Krugman’s one-state model, γ is inversely related to
friction; γ is a speed-of-adjustment parameter for labor. When g and γ differ by orders
of magnitude, the time scales over which the two state variables change are different:
there are ‘slow-fast dynamics’. Equation (9) can be rewritten as
K˙
g
= Lt − Kt . (10)
In the limit, as g → ∞, equation (10) implies that Kt = Lt , which implies that the
Manufacturing-Agricultural wage differential in period t is Lt − 0.5. This formula for
the wage differential is the same as in Krugman’s setting, using a = −0.5 and b = 1.
(We adopt these two parameter restrictions only to simplify the exposition.) More gen-
erally, when g is large (for fixed γ ), K adjusts rapidly, relative to the speed of adjustment
of L. Here, the pollution stock closely tracks L: K ≈ L for g large.
Thus, it would appear that the one-state model should provide a good approxima-
tion to the two-state model when the pollution stock adjusts rapidly. However, the two
models have different implications concerning Interpretation 2. Provided that g < ∞,
by making γ large migration becomes cheap enough that a worker can be sure of being
in the high wage sector ‘most of the time’, regardless of other workers’ decisions. In this
case, a worker bases her migration decision primarily on the state variables, not on her
beliefs about what other workers will do. Multiplicity is still possible, but it occurs for a
small set of initial conditions: it is unlikely.
When g is finite, current migration affects the second time-derivative of the wage
differential,
d2(K − 0.5)
dt2
= g(u − g(L − K)).
In contrast, in Krugman’s model (g = ∞), current migration affects the first time-
derivative of the wage differential. The presence of the second state variable mediates 
migration’s effect on the wage differential. In a discrete time setting, we saw that the 
presence of the second state variable causes migration to affect the wage differential with 
a lag.
4. Conclusion and discussion
Many dynamic models can be viewed as extensions of static models, obtained by intro-
ducing a payoff-relevant state variable that adjusts over time. There are usually many 
ways of making a model dynamic. If we think that the friction in the adjustment of 
the mobile factor is the single most important source of dynamics, it is essential to 
include the labor allocation as a state variable. The additional complexity that comes 
from including a second state variable is a powerful argument in favor of the one-state 
model.
In addition, we may think that the one-state model is adequate. For example, we might 
agree that the cross-sectoral externality is not literally associated with the pollution flow, 
and that instead it is associated with a pollution stock. However, if the pollution stock 
tracks the flow very closely, it might appear that there would be little loss of economic 
insight in replacing the pollution stock with the flow, thereby using a one-state model. 
In a standard optimal control setting (i.e., a game against nature), when the speed of 
adjustment of different state variables differs by orders of magnitude, a higher dimen-
sional problem can often be well-approximated using a lower dimensional state space. 
Where technology is convex, a competitive equilibrium can be obtained by solving a 
planner’s optimization problem.
However, in nonconvex settings, an equilibrium problem involving agents with ratio-
nal expectations can give rise to multiple equilibria. In this situation, it is typically not 
possible to obtain the equilibrium by solving a planner’s problem. Here, an apparently 
innocuous reduced-dimensional ‘approximation’ of a higher dimensional state space
might change important features of the problem.We used a simple model with two state
variables to illustrate and explain this possibility.
Whenwe ask how an increase in labor adjustment costs affects the likelihood ofmulti-
plicity, wemight have in mind two different relations. Friction affects the measure of the
set of (other) parameter values under which multiplicity is a possibility, and it affects the
measure of the set of initial conditions for which multiplicity actually occurs. In Krug-
man’s model and in our two-period simplification, the answer to the comparative statics
question is the same, regardless of which of these two interpretations we have in mind.
The theoretical and empirical literature on indeterminacy emphasizes the first inter-
pretation. There is little discussion in the literature involving the second interpretation,
which is arguably as important as the first.
We showed that when the labor allocation affects the wage differential with a lag,
either because of an environmental stock externality or due to a stock of knowledge aris-
ing from learning-by-doing, then the answer to the comparative statics question may
differ, depending on which interpretation one adopts. Under the first interpretation, a
decrease in friction alwaysmakesmultiplicitymore likely in ourmodel, just as in the one-
state setting. Under the second interpretation, the relation is non-monotonic, unlike in
the one-state setting.
When it is harder for an agent to take an action, such as moving to a new sector,
it seems that there would be fewer initial conditions under which her decision would
depend on beliefs about what other agents will do. This conclusion is (by now) so
well-established that it seems obvious. However, when the current wage differential is
sluggish, as occurs in our two-state model, the relation is reversed for low cost of labor
adjustment. With low adjustment costs, for most initial states the agent’s equilibrium
migration decision does not depend on beliefs about what others will do; whatever their
actions, it is cheap for an agent to move in future periods in order to remain in the high
wage sector. That is, for most initial conditions, agents have a dominant strategy when
adjustment costs are low.
This theoretical point shows the danger of drawing conclusions about the importance
of multiplicity based on estimates of structural parameters of the model (i.e., based on
Interpretation 1). Parameter estimates might suggest, for example, that there are signif-
icant cross-sectoral negative externalities or within-sectoral increasing returns to scale
(or some other source of non-convexity); that factor adjustment costs are very low; and
that a one-state variable model apparently provides a good approximation to the econ-
omy (because other state variables adjust rapidly). The conventional wisdom is that in
these circumstances the ROM is likely to have positive measure. Our results agree with
this conclusion, but also suggest that the measure of the ROM is likely to be very small,
and therefore the economy is unlikely to have multiple equilibria.
An economy that has multiple steady states but a unique equilibrium might evolve
in very different ways, depending on the initial condition. For example, an exogenous
change in pollution control technology or environmental policy can change incentives
about where to invest. Those kinds of exogenous changes can alter an interior steady
state, leading to standard comparative statics results. If the changes in pollution control
or policy are small, we expect the change in the steady state to also be small. How-
ever, those exogenous changes might shift the basins of attraction. If the shift causes
a predetermined state variable to now reside in a different basin of attraction, the small
exogenous change can cause the system to approach a different steady state. In that case,
the exogenous change causes a large change in the equilibrium trajectory, even though
each of the steady states has changed by a small amount.
Matters are even more complicated if there are multiple steady states and also multi-
ple equilibria, i.e. if the ROM has positive measure. Here, where the outcome depends on 
agents’ beliefs as well as economic fundamentals, the standard application of compara-
tive statics might tell us very little. We would have to know how the exogenous change 
alters agents’ beliefs.
Supplementary material. The supplementary material for this article can be found at https://doi.org/10. 
1017/S1355770X19000147.
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Appendix A: Proof of Proposition 1
We construct the equilibrium by working backwards, beginning with the agents’ problem 
in period 1, the last period during which they can migrate.
Using equation (5) and  l1 = l0 + u, we write the present value at t = 1 of being in  
Manufacturing in period 2, as
βk2 = β(k1 + G(l1 − k1)) = β(G(2 − G)l0 + (G − 1)2k0 + Gu) ≡ f (u; k0, l0).
Our timing conventions imply that this value is predetermined at period 1. The equilib-
rium for the subgame beginning in period 1 is therefore unique. Agents are indifferent 
between migrating and staying in their current sector if and only if βk2 = v/γ , i.e. if 
v = γ f (u; l0, k0). The speed of adjustment parameter affects the magnitude but not the sign 
of the quantity γ f (·), and f (·) is increasing in u for all G > 0.
Taking into account the labor supply constraint, the equilibrium value of v is
v(u) =
⎧⎨
⎩
0.5 − l0 − u if γ f > 0.5 − l0 − u
γ f if −0.5 − l0 − u ≤ γ f ≤ 0.5 − l0 − u
−0.5 − l0 − u if γ f < −0.5 − l0 − u
⎫⎬
⎭ . (A1)
Figure A6 shows an example of the graph of v(u), given particular values l0 = 0 and k0 > 0.
The u coordinate of the left and the right kink in this graph are, respectively
left kink: p ≡ ρ(l0, k0) − 0.51 + γβG
right kink: q ≡ ρ(l0, k0) + 0.51 + γβG ,
using the definition
ρ(l0, e0) ≡ 11 + γβG (γβG(G − 2) − 1)l0 − γβ(G − 1)
2k0).
For all l0 and k0, it is always the case that p < q. Inequality (6) implies that ρ is a
decreasing function of l0, so p and q are decreasing functions of l0 – a fact that we use
below.
Using these definitions and equation (A1) implies
dv(u)
du
=
⎧⎨
⎩
−1 if u > q
βGγ if p < u < q
−1 if u < p
⎫⎬
⎭ . (A2)
Thus, an increase in u increases the equilibrium v, provided that v is interior. In contrast,
an increase in u decreases the equilibrium v when this variable is on the boundary of the
labor supply constraint, as figure A6 illustrates.
In period 1 an agent is either indifferent between migrating and staying in her current
sector (at an interior equilibrium) or she strictly prefers to migrate (at a boundary equilib-
rium). Agents with rational expectations understand this fact in period 0. Therefore, the
benefit of migrating to Manufacturing in period 0 is the present value of the wage differ-
ential in period 1 (βk1), plus the present value of migration costs in period 1 (βv(u)/γ ).4
4The agent who migrates in period 0 avoids paying the period 1 migration costs. If migration in period
1 is at an interior level, period 1 migration costs equal the present value of the wage differential in period 2.
Figure A6. Equilibrium secondperiodmigration (v) as a function of first periodmigration (u) forβ = 0.8, γ = 2.5,
G = 0.5, l0 = 0 and k0 = 0.2.
The present value of migrating to Manufacturing in period 0 is therefore
β
(
k1 + v(u)
γ
)
= β
(
(1 − G)k0 + Gl0 + v(u)
γ
)
.
If the value of this expression is negative, its absolute value is the value of migrating to
Agriculture. For u > 0, the cost of moving to Manufacturing in period 0 is u/γ ; for u < 0,
the cost of moving to Agriculture is −u/γ .
Define the difference between benefits and costs of moving toManufacturing in the first
period as
h(u; l0, k0) ≡ β
(
(1 − G)k0 + Gl0 + v(u)
γ
)
− u
γ
. (A3)
(Again, if h < 0, then −h is the value of moving to Agriculture.) Using equation (A2), we
have
dh
du
=
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
−β−1
γ
if u > q
β2Gγ−1
γ
if p < u < q
−β−1
γ
if u < p
⎫⎪⎬
⎪⎭ . (A4)
Period 0 actions are always strategic substitutes for u < p and for u > q. For q < u < p,
period 0 actions are strategic complements if and only if β2Gγ > 1. When actions are
strategic substitutes (for all values of the state variable) the equilibrium is generically
unique; β2Gγ > 1 is therefore necessary for the ROM to have positive measure, as part
(i) of the Proposition states.
Since we are interested in the measure of the ROM as a function of γ , we hereafter
assume that β2Gγ > 1. Given this condition, we want to characterize the ROM, i.e. the
region of the (k, l) plane such that if (k0, l0) is in this region, there are multiple equilibria in
period 0.
An interior equilibrium requires that h = 0 and a stable interior equilibrium requires in
addition that dh/du < 0, evaluated at the equilibrium. (See footnote 1.) Since we are inter-
ested only in stable equilibria, equation (A4) means that we can rule out the possibility of
interior equilibria where p < u < q. We are left with three possibilities: (i) The equilibrium
is interior with 0.5 − l0 > u > q, (ii) The equilibrium is interior with −0.5 − l0 < u < p,
and (iii) The equilibrium is on the boundary, i.e. u = −0.5 − l0 or u = 0.5 − l0.
In order to construct the equilibrium, we determine the values of u for which
h(u; l0, k0) = 0 at a stable equilibrium. We first consider the case where u ≥ q; here, by
equation (A1), v = 0.5 − l0 − u. We substitute v = 0.5 − l0 − u into the function h(·)
defined in equation (A3), and solve h(·) = 0 to obtain an expression for u as a func-
tion of l0, k0. Denote this function as x(l0, k0). Next, we consider the case u ≤ p, where
v = −0.5 − l0 − u. We use this relation in the equation h(·) = 0 and solve for u to obtain
a function that we denote as y(l0, k0). These functions x(·) and y(·) are
x(l0, k0) ≡ α + 0.5β
β + 1
y(l0, k0) ≡ α − 0.5β
β + 1
, (A5)
using the definition
α ≡ β
1 + β ((γG − 1)l0 − γ (G − 1)k0).
With this notation, we write the equilibrium correspondence:
u(l0, k0) =
{
min{x, 0.5 − l0} if x ≥ q
max{y,−0.5 − l0} if y ≤ p
}
. (A6)
The first line states that if x ≥ q, then a stable equilibrium is u = x, provided that this value
is less than the upper limit of migration, 0.5 − l0; otherwise the labor supply constraint is
binding, and all labormoves toManufacturing. The second line has a similar interpretation.
Thus, there are two equilibria if the initial condition satisfies both q ≤ x and y ≤ p. Using
previous definitions, these two inequalities can be rewritten as
0.5
1 − γβ2G
(1.0 + γβG)(β + 1.0) ≤ α − ρ ≤ 0.5
γβ2G − 1
(1.0 + γβG)(β + 1.0) . (A7)
This inequality defines the ROM.
Figure A7 shows the graph of the equilibrium migration correspondence for k0 =
0.2,G = 0.7,β = 0.8, and γ = 5.
The top kinked line is the graph of min{x, .5 − l0} over the interval where x ≥ q. The
kink occurs where x = .5 − l0. The top straight line is the graph of q. The bottom kinked
line and the bottom straight line are the graphs of max{y,−.5 − l0} and of p, respectively.
The overlap of the two kinked lines defines the ROM, given k0 = 0.2. If, for example,
l0 = −0.05, the two equilibrium values of migration are u = −0.144 (a movement to
Agriculture) and u = 0.3 (a movement to Manufacturing).
Our assumptions β2Gγ > 1 and β ≤ 1 imply that Gγ > 1, so the slope x and y (as
functions of l0) are always positive, as shown. We noted above that inequality (6) implies
that the slope of p and q (graphed as functions of l0) is negative. Therefore, if x ≥ p is
satisfied, it holds for large values of l0; if y ≤ q is satisfied, it holds for small l0.
The boundaries of the overlap are determined by the solution to x = q and y = p.
Denote X(k0) as the value of l0 that satisfies x = q, and denote Y(k0) as the value of l0
that satisfies y = p. Some calculation yields the formulae in equation (7) of the text. This
step establishes part (ii) of the Proposition.
Figure A7. The equilibrium first period migration (u) as a function of l0 for β = 0.8, γ = 5, G = 0.7 and k0 = 0.2.
The vertical distance between the boundaries of the ROM isM, defined in equation (8).
We noted in the text that inequality (6) and the assumption γβ2G > 1 imply that χ > 0.
Therefore, when these two inequalities hold, the ROMhas positivemeasure. This fact estab-
lishes sufficiency in part (i) of the Proposition. The denominator ofM is quadratic in γ and
the numerator is linear, soM → 0 as γ → ∞. Thus, the measure of the ROM approaches
0 as γ → ∞. Since the measure is 0 for γβ2G < 1, positive for γβ2G > 1 and approaches
0 as γ → ∞, it is non-monotonic in γ , as part (iii) of the Proposition states.
